The USMNT version of the 4-5-1 (a.k.a. the 4-2-3-1)

Now I know everyone is excited about this new, supercool formation that Bob Bradley unveiled against Jamaica that led us to a 2-0 victory in our most complete match in the Gold Cup, and probably since the second half against Slovenia (which, in all fairness, wasn't a complete game, so I retract that statement). People who regularly follow the team know this, but the 4-5-1, while a relatively new arrow in Bob Bradley's quiver, has been an idea he has been tinkering with since the end of the World Cup and Sunday's game was the first time it really clicked the way it is supposed to. The impetus for the switch is mostly our lack of dependable strikers and overabundance of quality holding midfielders. In essence, to get the best XI on the field, we have to play an additional midfielder since that is where we have more talent and experience. The U.S. 4-5-1 looks a little something like this:

The difference in the base formation from the 4-4-2 is that we trade a striker for a central attacking midfielder and slide the striker that is left to the middle of the field. Tactically this changes a lot of things for the team. The overabundance of midfielders means that if somebody loses their shape and drifts out of position (whether on purpose to make an attacking run into unoccupied space or pick up an opposing player, or on accident just by being undisciplined) there is at least one midfielder who can cover for them. This leads to a more fluid formation in the middle of the field, where the midfielders are more free to switch positions with each other without as great of a fear of being caught out of position by a counterattack. In the Jamaica game, there were lots of times when Dempsey would cut inside and effectively switch positions with Kljestan or one of the holding mids (Jones or Bradley) would push up into unoccupied space allowing the other to cover the defensive responsibilities. Additionally, the central attacking midfielder (Kljestan, or Holden when he's healthy) provides a link between the defense and the offense that is lacking in the 4-4-2, which decreases reliance on the long ball by filling the gap between the holding mids and the strikers. This creates more options for build-up play to diversify the offensive portfolio.

Not everything about the 4-5-1 is rainbows and butterflies and trophies though. That one lone man up top has a big responsibility. His holdup play must be superb since all his support comes in the form of midfielder runs. Additionally, he has to cover the whole width of the field, and has no partner up front to share the work load with in covering attacking runs from the defense. The midfield has to be extremely aware, especially of attacking runs from the opposing teams outside backs. The U.S. has no natural holdup striker to fill this role, as both Agudelo and Altidore are better facing goal than away from it.

The switch to the 4-5-1, especially against a Jamaican team where possessing the ball was paramount to the U.S. tactics, proved to be a stellar move. I have to tip my hat to coach Bob. I don’t often agree with his tactics, but he got couldn’t have gotten it more right in this case. Overloading the midfield allowed us to possess the ball almost the whole game and wore down Jamaica by making them work on defense. The advantage in possession and numbers in the center of the field really broke up Jamaica’s offensive rhythm and kept their counterattack at bay all night. Additionally, Agudelo’s holdup play was much better than I expected to see. Despite what I said last paragraph, his technical ability showed, not just in taking one players one-on-one, but in the little touches to keep possession of the ball at his feet with his back toward goal.

Before we get too excited, remember that Bob Bradley has been tinkering with the 4-5-1 since October 2010. He tried it out in friendlies against Brazil (first half), Poland (full game), Columbia (first half), South Africa (first half), Chile (first half), Paraguay (second half), and Argentina (full game) with mixed results. During those games the U.S. scored 5 goals, only 2 of which came out of the 4-5-1 (both goals against Poland). All other goals (against, Chile, Argentina, and South Africa) came once the U.S. switched back to the 4-4-2 after halftime, and in the case of Chile and South Africa, that switch didn't happen until the 60th minute (the switch came at halftime of the Argentina game). So in friendlies since South Africa, and leaving out the Spain debacle, we have spent at least half of the game in every friendly in the 4-5-1 and we scored only two goals, while conceding 6. In the 4-4-2 over that time, we scored 3 goals and only conceded 2. In the Gold Cup, however, we have scored 2, conceded 0 in the 4-5-1 and scored 4 and conceded 2 in the 4-4-2. What does it all mean? The 4-5-1 is still a work in progress, but the flexibility and change of pace it provides adds another dynamic to the U.S. attack that has lacked creativity. For the first time in a long time, the United States truly played the beautiful game beautifully.