The main drawback of the 4-5-1

Thus far most of my analysis of the 4-5-1 has been positive. This is probably because the result against Jamaica was so positive. However, every formation has its strengths and weaknesses, and the weakness of the 4-5-1 is that it depends on you keeping possession for it to work properly. Against a technically gifted side (like Spain, just as a random example that has nothing to do with recent friendlies or pitiful results) that is able to cause turnovers and rarely gives up possession, the 4-5-1 produces the exact opposite results as it did against Jamaica.

If you are constantly under pressure from the opposing team and unable to build possession, you are fighting a losing battle. The four defenders and five midfielders effectively form a shell around the penalty box, leaving the striker on an island as the only attacking player. If the other team maintains possession and pressure, once you win the ball you are forced to quickly release it, but there is nobody there to link the play to the forwards, so the only option is to clear the ball. Since your striker can only be at one place at one time, the majority of these clearances wind up being won by the opposing teams defenders, who reset possession and repeat the process again. At that point you are essentially playing not to lose, which in my book is worse than losing itself.

I don't think Panama has the quality to be able to pose this kind of problem tonight, but going forward this is something I will be following closely. Can the U.S. cultivate the type of skills and movement required to possess the ball against more technical sides? If we want to take the next step, and if that step is going to come under the 4-5-1, that will probably be the key.

UPDATE: Apparently Bob Bradley agrees with me, some of his comments on the 4-5-1 courtesy of ESPN:
"In an ideal world, when you get good movement, the forward is not alone that often," said Bradley. "But there are still ways [in which] other people are moving quickly when necessary to join in and be available so that you aren't just leaving him stranded. One of the things that becomes key to make that happen is you need to be able to move the ball well. If it's a day when you're under pressure, and you've got a lot of guys back, and now when you get the ball you're pressed right away and all you can do is play it up to the forward, he's going to feel like he's on his own. But if it's a day where as a team, you're good with the ball, then there are times when it doesn't really look like one forward."
I guess we agree on one thing at least :)

Altidore is out the rest of the GC

You can see the article at ussoccer.com here:
http://www.ussoccer.com/News/Mens-National-Team/2011/06/Altidore-Sidelined-46-Weeks-After-Hamstring-Injury.aspx

4-5-1 vs 4-4-2 Movement off the ball

I watched the Jamaica game again last night, and want to explain one aspect of the 4-5-1 that I think really helped us with possession. Let’s throw up the graphic of the base formation again shall we?

One of the reasons this worked so well is because we finally were moving off the ball. One of my chief criticisms of the U.S. attack of late is the lack of movement and runs into space to allow for positive buildup towards the attacking third. The U.S. typically filters possession through their holding midfielders Bradley and Jones. In the more structured 4-4-2, as one pushes forward with the ball, the other will drop off to be sure to maintain defensive shape (in this example Jones has the ball and Bradley drops).

This leaves the only options a longer ball to one of the forwards, a long ball to the other side of the field, a short ball to the near side winger, or to turn and drop it to the fullbacks or other holding mid. If they drop the ball, it usually ends up switching sides and filtering back to the holding mids who once again have the same options.

The only 3 attacking options are 2 long balls or a short pass the winger who is then pinned in a similar position without many options going forward. Many people wonder how the U.S. has become so reliant on the long ball, the formation, tactics, and philosophy presented here are the main culprit. Additionally, this leads to stagnation and little off the ball movement. Nobody is in a position to make an incisive run except the other holding mid, but he is duty bound to stay back because vacating the defensive space in front of the center backs is of higher priority than making an attacking run.

Let’s look at the same scenario in the 4-5-1. U.S. wins the ball and it is played to Jones who turns and starts upfield and sees a completely different field in front of him.

The 4-5-1 promotes movement off the ball because it creates natural passing triangles in the midfield and because the extra midfield players are close enough to cover for each other if they make attacking runs. If Dempsey wants to make a run inside, Kljestan has the flexibility to push wide to fill the space he just vacated. Similarly, should Bradley decide to make a through run up the middle of the pitch, Kljestan can simply step a few feet back. The defensive mid who was covering Kljestan is forced to pick up Bradley because his movement toward goal is the greatest threat. This opens up space for Kljestan as he steps a few feet back. If they leave Bradley uncovered, Jones can play a through ball and he is in on the defense. If they cover Bradley, Jones can lay the ball off to Kljestan, who now has space in front of him to advance the ball. If the outside midfielder pushes inside to overload, Donovan can step outside. Jones now has as many short pass attacking options (3) as he had total attacking options in the 4-4-2, and he still has the long ball to the forward or Dempsey as an option. Here’s a diagram of this scenario:

What it boils down to is that the holding mid has more options for short passes that maintain possession than he does in the 4-4-2. Additionally, the pressure relief is a neutral pass in the 4-5-1 (the Kljestan square ball) as opposed to a negative pass in the 4-4-2 (to the withdrawn holding mid or defense). When the majority of the play goes through the holding mid, this multiplicity of options allows for possession and buildup play to occur, and creates a more consistent offense.

The USMNT version of the 4-5-1 (a.k.a. the 4-2-3-1)

Now I know everyone is excited about this new, supercool formation that Bob Bradley unveiled against Jamaica that led us to a 2-0 victory in our most complete match in the Gold Cup, and probably since the second half against Slovenia (which, in all fairness, wasn't a complete game, so I retract that statement). People who regularly follow the team know this, but the 4-5-1, while a relatively new arrow in Bob Bradley's quiver, has been an idea he has been tinkering with since the end of the World Cup and Sunday's game was the first time it really clicked the way it is supposed to. The impetus for the switch is mostly our lack of dependable strikers and overabundance of quality holding midfielders. In essence, to get the best XI on the field, we have to play an additional midfielder since that is where we have more talent and experience. The U.S. 4-5-1 looks a little something like this:

The difference in the base formation from the 4-4-2 is that we trade a striker for a central attacking midfielder and slide the striker that is left to the middle of the field. Tactically this changes a lot of things for the team. The overabundance of midfielders means that if somebody loses their shape and drifts out of position (whether on purpose to make an attacking run into unoccupied space or pick up an opposing player, or on accident just by being undisciplined) there is at least one midfielder who can cover for them. This leads to a more fluid formation in the middle of the field, where the midfielders are more free to switch positions with each other without as great of a fear of being caught out of position by a counterattack. In the Jamaica game, there were lots of times when Dempsey would cut inside and effectively switch positions with Kljestan or one of the holding mids (Jones or Bradley) would push up into unoccupied space allowing the other to cover the defensive responsibilities. Additionally, the central attacking midfielder (Kljestan, or Holden when he's healthy) provides a link between the defense and the offense that is lacking in the 4-4-2, which decreases reliance on the long ball by filling the gap between the holding mids and the strikers. This creates more options for build-up play to diversify the offensive portfolio.

Not everything about the 4-5-1 is rainbows and butterflies and trophies though. That one lone man up top has a big responsibility. His holdup play must be superb since all his support comes in the form of midfielder runs. Additionally, he has to cover the whole width of the field, and has no partner up front to share the work load with in covering attacking runs from the defense. The midfield has to be extremely aware, especially of attacking runs from the opposing teams outside backs. The U.S. has no natural holdup striker to fill this role, as both Agudelo and Altidore are better facing goal than away from it.

The switch to the 4-5-1, especially against a Jamaican team where possessing the ball was paramount to the U.S. tactics, proved to be a stellar move. I have to tip my hat to coach Bob. I don’t often agree with his tactics, but he got couldn’t have gotten it more right in this case. Overloading the midfield allowed us to possess the ball almost the whole game and wore down Jamaica by making them work on defense. The advantage in possession and numbers in the center of the field really broke up Jamaica’s offensive rhythm and kept their counterattack at bay all night. Additionally, Agudelo’s holdup play was much better than I expected to see. Despite what I said last paragraph, his technical ability showed, not just in taking one players one-on-one, but in the little touches to keep possession of the ball at his feet with his back toward goal.

Before we get too excited, remember that Bob Bradley has been tinkering with the 4-5-1 since October 2010. He tried it out in friendlies against Brazil (first half), Poland (full game), Columbia (first half), South Africa (first half), Chile (first half), Paraguay (second half), and Argentina (full game) with mixed results. During those games the U.S. scored 5 goals, only 2 of which came out of the 4-5-1 (both goals against Poland). All other goals (against, Chile, Argentina, and South Africa) came once the U.S. switched back to the 4-4-2 after halftime, and in the case of Chile and South Africa, that switch didn't happen until the 60th minute (the switch came at halftime of the Argentina game). So in friendlies since South Africa, and leaving out the Spain debacle, we have spent at least half of the game in every friendly in the 4-5-1 and we scored only two goals, while conceding 6. In the 4-4-2 over that time, we scored 3 goals and only conceded 2. In the Gold Cup, however, we have scored 2, conceded 0 in the 4-5-1 and scored 4 and conceded 2 in the 4-4-2. What does it all mean? The 4-5-1 is still a work in progress, but the flexibility and change of pace it provides adds another dynamic to the U.S. attack that has lacked creativity. For the first time in a long time, the United States truly played the beautiful game beautifully.

The USMNT version of the 4-4-2

This seems like a mistimed post since Bob Bradley decided to move to the 4-5-1 (or 4-2-3-1 depending on who you ask) for last night's game, but I'll cover that formation in the next couple of days. Bob's formation of choice for most of his time as the national team coach has been the 4-4-2. It was his formation for most of World Cup Qualifying, the entire World Cup, and had been the formation he used in all three group stage games. He totally threw me a curveball last night and ruined my blogging groove, but considering the results, I'm not complaining. Regardless, the chances of him reverting back to the 4-4-2 in the future remain extremely high so it is still educational to analyze how the U.S. usually sets up when in this formation.

Let's take a look at the lineup that was used for the first two Gold Cup group games. This is similar to the lineup that Bob Bradley has been using for the past 5 years with a few key exceptions. Those exceptions are that Bocanegra and Oguchi Onyewu have typically played the center back positions with Bornstein or Spector as the left back. When Spector and Bornstein inevitably failed miserably in the important matches leading up to the World Cup and this Gold Cup, the US copes by sliding Bocanegra into left back and replacing him at center back with Jay DeMerit (in the World Cup) or Tim Ream/Clarence Goodson (as seen below in the Gold Cup lineup). Also, Jermaine Jones was only recently allowed to play for the U.S. Maurice Edu or Ricardo Clark have been Michael Bradley's usual running mates in center mid until recently. Without further ado then, the Bob Bradley 4-4-2:

When the US deploys this formation, a couple of the typical deficiencies of the 4-4-2 crop up. Neither Bradley nor Jones (nor Edu) have the greatest distribution skills, which leads to a lot of long balls and lack of possession in the middle of the field. Additionally, none of our forwards are particularly adept at holding up the ball or playing with their back the goal. Both Altidore and Agudelo are more dangerous making through runs and getting the ball in space where they are able to turn and attack towards goal. Altidore certainly has the physical tools to become a superb hold-up striker, but has yet to develop these physical attributes into technical strengths.

Our two best players (although you wouldn't know it necessarily by watching just the Gold Cup), Dempsey (a.k.a. Deuce) and Donovan are deployed on the wings in this formation. Both of them like to make runs into the defense, typically attacking inward rather than spreading the field wide. On the right side of the pitch this works phenomenally. Donovan and Dolo have worked together for so long that they have a great understanding of how to work together and know instinctively what the other is thinking and how to get each other the ball in dangerous positions. The left side however, is a bigger problem.

Deuce loves cutting inside and making diagonal runs at the defense, and does so even more regularly than Donovan. This wouldn't be so much of a problem if we had a serviceable left back who could push into the vacated space, but up until the last two games, left back has been the black hole of the U.S. depth chart. Try as we may to fill it, it has gobbled up whomever we have tried to insert there and left nary a trace. The aforementioned Spector and Bornstein combination had been so inept that Bob Bradley has done his best impression of the Little Dutch Boy by trying to desperately keep us from leaking goals by plugging Bocanegra into the gaping hole in the dyke at left back. The problem is that Bocanegra is a purely defensive peg in a two-way player hole. He has done an admirable job playing out of position, but does not get forward or pose a threat down the wing. The lack of a true left back has left us deficient on the left side for the entirety of Bob Bradley's coaching tenure.

While this isn't necessarily his fault as he can only use the talent pool that is available to him, the formation we play emphasizes this weakness because of Deuce's propensity to float inside rather than stay wide. This has been the case for the last 5 years, and no tactical adjustment has been made to fill in the gap. Eric Lichaj has been an absolute revelation in the Guadaloupe and Jamaica games, and if he can be groomed into the left back role and fill it well against quality opposition, he alone can change the entire dynamic of the US attack. Of course, he plays right back with his club (Aston Villa) and is right-footed so it isn't necessarily the best fit, but it's a better fit than we've seen in a long time on the USMNT.

The strength of this formation is obviously in the central defensive portion of the team. Bradley, Jones, Edu, Goodson, Bocanegra, Demerit, and (until his injury in WC qualifying) Onyewu are all physical tackling machines and do a good job of clogging the middle of the field and forcing the ball out wide and into less dangerous positions. Unfortunately, the attack has always been stunted and inconsistent due to the over-reliance on the long ball. Against lesser competition we find ways to score, but the lack of creative talent apart from Deuce and LD, and inadequate service from the midfielders to the forwards causes us offensive headaches against better opposition. This defensive formation makes us very reliant on set pieces for offense, and had led to a half decade of inconsistent results.

USMNT Tactics: Formations - The 4-4-2

There are more formations in soccer than there are nations in the Gold Cup (don't believe me? Here is the wiki link). I will not take time to detail them all, but I would like to cover some of the options that I have seen employed by the U.S. and some that might better fit our personnel. Therefore, each formation will be a two-part series. The first part will be a basic description of the formation, and the second part will be how it is utilized, or potentially could be utilized, by the USA. Under the current manager, the USMNT has generally employed a classical 4-4-2 composed of two central defenders, two outside backs, two holding midfielders, two wingers, and two forwards. Visually, it looks a little something like this:

The 4-4-2 emphasizes defense by placing two defensive holding center midfielders, whose primary role is to help the defense by tracking back, tackling hard, and putting out fires. Should trouble arise, they release the ball forward via the long ball because there exists a lack of players between them and the forwards to link the defense or defensive midfield with the attack. It is also the responsibility of the center midfielders to support the attack by pushing forward during offensive possession, so they end up running a great deal because their role demands them to play an integral part in defending but also get forward when the occasion presents itself. However, since defense is the priority, only one of the center mids will typically push forward during the attack.

The wingers have similar duties, although it could be argued that they have a greater offensive role and a lesser defensive role. Nevertheless, it is their responsibility to track back on defense and cover any opposing wingers or outside fullbacks from the other team that push forward to attack. They widen the field and make runs so that the forwards, who have presumably received and controlled the long ball that was sent to them, can lay it off to the wingers who are cutting inside, or play a through ball to the outside for the wingers to cross back into the box. Again, the emphasis is on lots of running. I think the logic is something to the effect of "if you can't beat them, just try to run lots and get in their way" (can you tell that I'm a huge fan of the classic 4-4-2). The wingers' responsibilities looks something like this:

The other positions are fairly self-explanatory. Forwards win the long balls, and hold them to lay off to the wingers or one of the center mids who are pushing up behind them. They also make runs into the box for crosses and in general just try to put the ball in the back of the net. The center backs are full on defenders and provide a pressure relief valve for the center midfielders, but usually just boot the ball towards the forwards if they get possession. The outside backs can have an offensive role by providing overlapping runs down the wings, but are primarily responsible for defending the opposing team's wingers or outside backs who attack down their side of the field.

In summary, on defense, the formation looks something like this:

And on offense, something like this:

4-4-2 Pros:

Easy to implement and does not require great technical skill to employ, only discipline. Highly structured defense and emphasis placed on defense means, when implemented correctly, the opposing team has a difficult time breaking down the defense and unclogging the center of the field since at least 4 defensive players will be there at all times. If you have good athletes, this can utilize them by placing emphasis on athletic ability and conditioning.

4-4-2 Cons:

Places a great emphasis on athletic ability and conditioning, so if you don't have good athletes, your team invariably runs out of gas or can't win enough long balls to provide a sustained attack. Emphasis on defense and lack of link-up play can lead to a stagnant offense and an abundance of boring, defensive soccer. Basically cedes all possession to the other team when playing against a more technically gifted side, since both center midfielders drop back, there is a gap between the midfield and forwards the other team can exploit to control possession.

Made famous by:

The Italians, specifically A.C. Milan under Arrigo Sacchi and Fabio Capello. Has also become very widespread in the English Premier League, and is employed by the English National Team under the current leadership of Fabio Capello. Capello has received a lot of criticism for his strict adherence to the 4-4-2 as many see it as an outdated. Italy's utilization of the 4-4-2 coincides with their national soccer philosophy to defend until the opponent has a miscue and then pounce on the counter attack and make them pay.

Problem #1 with the USMNT Tactics: Philosophy

I am going to do my best to not make this a flame Bob Bradley blog. I will try to be reasonable and objective. My biggest concern with the USMNT is the lack of a philosophy, identity, or style that is uniquely our own and captures the essence of our nation. When you think of Brazilian soccer you think of the joga bonito, Spain has their tika-taka, the Dutch invented Total Football, Italy sits back and defends until you make a mistake and then they pounce, Germany is committed to its shape and moves as a cohesive unit, Argentina has their flowing passes and superb individual dribbling, etc., etc.

The United States is still very young in terms of soccer, we didn't really get started until sometime around the '90 or '94 World Cups, so we only have had about 15-20 years of history in the sport. Nevertheless, over that time the hallmark of the National Team has been industry and, to a lesser degree, athleticism. United States players work hard, have good conditioning, can run the full 90 minutes, and leave it all out on the field. Are these admirable qualities and a good foundation for soccer? Yes, undoubtedly. Are they a team philosophy? Perhaps, but if that is the end all, be all of US Soccer, we will never become more than a mediocre World Cup team, and that isn't good enough.

Bradley Ball, as many are wont to call it, is defined by this industry as well as an over-reliance on the completely unreliable long ball. We don't control the ball, opting instead to play a lot of long balls that are supposed to be directed to a holding striker. At least 6 of our current field players run first, defend second, and attack last (all 4 defenders and our two defensive holding mids). If any of them get into trouble, they boot the ball downfield, effectively ceding possession in order to maintain a sense of security in knowing that a the giveaway is occurring far from our own goal. These are effectively the same tactics that most of the intramural teams I played on in college use. That our national team plays the same style as a team composed of people who didn't even player soccer most of their lives is disconcerting, disappointing, and, at the end of the day, completely unacceptable.

If we want our soccer team to be an indication of who we are, and if I want to be entertained when I watch my national team, we need a change in how we play. Currently, the American version of the beautiful game is fairly ugly, mundane, and frustrating to watch. I don't ask that we win every game, I just ask that we put a product out there that I can relate with and that makes me want to watch and cheer.

The United States of America was not built on industrious labor alone, we don't just work hard, we are innovative and we work smart. This is the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution and the home of the internet. That dynamic is not there with our national team. Playing long balls is like picking the seeds out of cotton instead of using a cotton gin, or dusting off my old World Book Encyclopedia instead of using Google on my phone. It's less effective, simple, archaic, outdated, and won't get us where we want to be. In my opinion, we don't necessarily need Spain's tika-taka or Brazil's joga bonito, but we need incisive through-balls, we have to learn to control the midfield, to possess the ball, and to laugh in the face of defenders who think they can take it away from us. We need creative and smart runs off the ball. We run like mad when the other team has the ball and stand around like statues once we win it from them. That isn't smart soccer, and it isn't productive industry, it's wasting our energy just to boot the ball back to them and waste more. Anybody who has played football, basketball, or soccer knows that you expend way more energy playing defense than you do playing offense. Why? Because you should know where the ball is going on offense and you can take a direct path to where you need to be instead of reacting to what others are doing. We are wasting our industry in the least productive aspect of the game.

If US soccer is to take the next step and if we truly want to be counted among the world's elite teams, our tactics have to change. My primary criticism of Bob Bradley is his unwillingness to invest in a system that pays dividends greater than what we have seen in the past. I know we will suffer growing pains during the adjustment, I know results won't come immediately, but the adjustment has to be made if we don't want to be mired in mediocrity for the foreseeable future. America has never been satisfied with mediocrity, except, it seems, for the USSF.