4-5-1 vs 4-4-2 Movement off the ball

I watched the Jamaica game again last night, and want to explain one aspect of the 4-5-1 that I think really helped us with possession. Let’s throw up the graphic of the base formation again shall we?

One of the reasons this worked so well is because we finally were moving off the ball. One of my chief criticisms of the U.S. attack of late is the lack of movement and runs into space to allow for positive buildup towards the attacking third. The U.S. typically filters possession through their holding midfielders Bradley and Jones. In the more structured 4-4-2, as one pushes forward with the ball, the other will drop off to be sure to maintain defensive shape (in this example Jones has the ball and Bradley drops).

This leaves the only options a longer ball to one of the forwards, a long ball to the other side of the field, a short ball to the near side winger, or to turn and drop it to the fullbacks or other holding mid. If they drop the ball, it usually ends up switching sides and filtering back to the holding mids who once again have the same options.

The only 3 attacking options are 2 long balls or a short pass the winger who is then pinned in a similar position without many options going forward. Many people wonder how the U.S. has become so reliant on the long ball, the formation, tactics, and philosophy presented here are the main culprit. Additionally, this leads to stagnation and little off the ball movement. Nobody is in a position to make an incisive run except the other holding mid, but he is duty bound to stay back because vacating the defensive space in front of the center backs is of higher priority than making an attacking run.

Let’s look at the same scenario in the 4-5-1. U.S. wins the ball and it is played to Jones who turns and starts upfield and sees a completely different field in front of him.

The 4-5-1 promotes movement off the ball because it creates natural passing triangles in the midfield and because the extra midfield players are close enough to cover for each other if they make attacking runs. If Dempsey wants to make a run inside, Kljestan has the flexibility to push wide to fill the space he just vacated. Similarly, should Bradley decide to make a through run up the middle of the pitch, Kljestan can simply step a few feet back. The defensive mid who was covering Kljestan is forced to pick up Bradley because his movement toward goal is the greatest threat. This opens up space for Kljestan as he steps a few feet back. If they leave Bradley uncovered, Jones can play a through ball and he is in on the defense. If they cover Bradley, Jones can lay the ball off to Kljestan, who now has space in front of him to advance the ball. If the outside midfielder pushes inside to overload, Donovan can step outside. Jones now has as many short pass attacking options (3) as he had total attacking options in the 4-4-2, and he still has the long ball to the forward or Dempsey as an option. Here’s a diagram of this scenario:

What it boils down to is that the holding mid has more options for short passes that maintain possession than he does in the 4-4-2. Additionally, the pressure relief is a neutral pass in the 4-5-1 (the Kljestan square ball) as opposed to a negative pass in the 4-4-2 (to the withdrawn holding mid or defense). When the majority of the play goes through the holding mid, this multiplicity of options allows for possession and buildup play to occur, and creates a more consistent offense.