The USMNT version of the 4-4-2

This seems like a mistimed post since Bob Bradley decided to move to the 4-5-1 (or 4-2-3-1 depending on who you ask) for last night's game, but I'll cover that formation in the next couple of days. Bob's formation of choice for most of his time as the national team coach has been the 4-4-2. It was his formation for most of World Cup Qualifying, the entire World Cup, and had been the formation he used in all three group stage games. He totally threw me a curveball last night and ruined my blogging groove, but considering the results, I'm not complaining. Regardless, the chances of him reverting back to the 4-4-2 in the future remain extremely high so it is still educational to analyze how the U.S. usually sets up when in this formation.

Let's take a look at the lineup that was used for the first two Gold Cup group games. This is similar to the lineup that Bob Bradley has been using for the past 5 years with a few key exceptions. Those exceptions are that Bocanegra and Oguchi Onyewu have typically played the center back positions with Bornstein or Spector as the left back. When Spector and Bornstein inevitably failed miserably in the important matches leading up to the World Cup and this Gold Cup, the US copes by sliding Bocanegra into left back and replacing him at center back with Jay DeMerit (in the World Cup) or Tim Ream/Clarence Goodson (as seen below in the Gold Cup lineup). Also, Jermaine Jones was only recently allowed to play for the U.S. Maurice Edu or Ricardo Clark have been Michael Bradley's usual running mates in center mid until recently. Without further ado then, the Bob Bradley 4-4-2:

When the US deploys this formation, a couple of the typical deficiencies of the 4-4-2 crop up. Neither Bradley nor Jones (nor Edu) have the greatest distribution skills, which leads to a lot of long balls and lack of possession in the middle of the field. Additionally, none of our forwards are particularly adept at holding up the ball or playing with their back the goal. Both Altidore and Agudelo are more dangerous making through runs and getting the ball in space where they are able to turn and attack towards goal. Altidore certainly has the physical tools to become a superb hold-up striker, but has yet to develop these physical attributes into technical strengths.

Our two best players (although you wouldn't know it necessarily by watching just the Gold Cup), Dempsey (a.k.a. Deuce) and Donovan are deployed on the wings in this formation. Both of them like to make runs into the defense, typically attacking inward rather than spreading the field wide. On the right side of the pitch this works phenomenally. Donovan and Dolo have worked together for so long that they have a great understanding of how to work together and know instinctively what the other is thinking and how to get each other the ball in dangerous positions. The left side however, is a bigger problem.

Deuce loves cutting inside and making diagonal runs at the defense, and does so even more regularly than Donovan. This wouldn't be so much of a problem if we had a serviceable left back who could push into the vacated space, but up until the last two games, left back has been the black hole of the U.S. depth chart. Try as we may to fill it, it has gobbled up whomever we have tried to insert there and left nary a trace. The aforementioned Spector and Bornstein combination had been so inept that Bob Bradley has done his best impression of the Little Dutch Boy by trying to desperately keep us from leaking goals by plugging Bocanegra into the gaping hole in the dyke at left back. The problem is that Bocanegra is a purely defensive peg in a two-way player hole. He has done an admirable job playing out of position, but does not get forward or pose a threat down the wing. The lack of a true left back has left us deficient on the left side for the entirety of Bob Bradley's coaching tenure.

While this isn't necessarily his fault as he can only use the talent pool that is available to him, the formation we play emphasizes this weakness because of Deuce's propensity to float inside rather than stay wide. This has been the case for the last 5 years, and no tactical adjustment has been made to fill in the gap. Eric Lichaj has been an absolute revelation in the Guadaloupe and Jamaica games, and if he can be groomed into the left back role and fill it well against quality opposition, he alone can change the entire dynamic of the US attack. Of course, he plays right back with his club (Aston Villa) and is right-footed so it isn't necessarily the best fit, but it's a better fit than we've seen in a long time on the USMNT.

The strength of this formation is obviously in the central defensive portion of the team. Bradley, Jones, Edu, Goodson, Bocanegra, Demerit, and (until his injury in WC qualifying) Onyewu are all physical tackling machines and do a good job of clogging the middle of the field and forcing the ball out wide and into less dangerous positions. Unfortunately, the attack has always been stunted and inconsistent due to the over-reliance on the long ball. Against lesser competition we find ways to score, but the lack of creative talent apart from Deuce and LD, and inadequate service from the midfielders to the forwards causes us offensive headaches against better opposition. This defensive formation makes us very reliant on set pieces for offense, and had led to a half decade of inconsistent results.